H Heuristics Polycrisis Resilience Series

Research Report · November 2026

Global Economic Convergence as a Resilience Strategy

How narrowing the gaps between rich and poor economies can reduce vulnerability to the polycrisis, 2026–2100

Hunter Hughes, Founder of H Heuristics

  • Income
  • Productivity
  • Industrial capacity
  • Human capital
  • Infrastructure
  • Energy access
  • Digital connectivity
  • Health and institutions

Abstract

Global economic convergence, the process through which lower-income economies narrow income, productivity, technological, and infrastructure gaps with higher-income economies, is often framed as a development objective. This report argues that convergence should also be understood as a core strategy for Polycrisis Resilience, reducing vulnerability to interconnected crises across climate, health, energy, economic, and social systems. Drawing on data from 217 economies, the analysis examines convergence across eight dimensions: income, productivity, industrial capacity, human capital, infrastructure, energy access, digital connectivity, and health and institutional capacity. The report introduces the concept of Convergent Resilience Dividends, whereby a single intervention, such as reliable electricity, digital connectivity, or clean cooking access, reduces multiple forms of vulnerability simultaneously.The findings show that convergence has occurred, but unevenly and increasingly slowly. Since 1990, much of the narrowing between rich and poor economies has been concentrated in a limited number of large emerging economies, while many low-income countries have experienced little or no catch-up. Access-oriented indicators such as electricity, internet connectivity, and sanitation have improved substantially, whereas productivity, industrial capacity, and institutional effectiveness continue to lag. Evidence presented in the report demonstrates that vulnerability to crises is more strongly associated with levels of development than exposure to hazards themselves, suggesting that convergence can strengthen societies' abilities to anticipate, absorb, adapt to, and recover from disruption. Using scenario analysis to 2100, the report explores alternative futures shaped by differing rates of convergence. Results indicate that accelerated and resilience-oriented convergence pathways produce substantially better outcomes across infrastructure, health, education, and systemic vulnerability metrics than pathways characterized by stalled development and persistent fragmentation. The report concludes that convergence is neither automatic nor sufficient on its own, but when directed toward productivity, reliable infrastructure, human capital, and institutional capacity, it represents one of the most powerful long-term approaches for reducing global vulnerability in an increasingly interconnected age of risk.

The harm done by the century’s interconnected crises depends on the hazards and on how vulnerable people and systems are. Vulnerability falls as economies catch up, but catching up has stalled for most developing economies.

Core proposition, H Heuristics

Key findings

  1. Convergence is real, and it is concentrated. Income in the Global South rose from 13% of the high-income level in 1990 to 23% in 2024, but almost all of it came from China and India: without them the figure was 20% in 1990 and 20% in 2024. Upper-middle-income countries went from 18% to 36%; low-income countries went from 3% to 4%.
  2. The catch-up was a short, strong episode. Across 196 economies, an economy with half the income of another grew about 0.4 percentage points a year faster in 2000–19, after roughly 170 years in which the gap widened. Since 2019 only 39% of developing economies have outgrown the United States, against 85% in 2000–10.
  3. Access has converged faster than income. In lower-middle-income countries internet use rose from 1% to 59%, clean cooking from 24% to 64% and electricity access from 57% to 91%, while output per worker rose from 12% to 19% of the high-income level. Technology moves quickly across borders; productive capacity moves slowly.
  4. Vulnerability falls with development, hazard does not. Across 183 countries, income explains 75% of the variation in lack of coping capacity but only 20% of the variation in hazard exposure. Within countries, a 10% rise in income goes with a 10% fall in child mortality.
  5. Convergence pays resilience dividends in bundles. Across 107 developing economies the pace of progress in electricity, clean cooking, internet and sanitation moves together even after income growth is held fixed, and 14% of countries advanced fast on six or seven of seven dimensions against 6% by chance. Gains in life expectancy and schooling did not follow within two decades.
  6. New technologies let some countries skip steps. Mobile money, distributed solar, mobile broadband, digital learning and satellite links reach people without the networks that earlier generations needed. Bypassing has limits: it needs reliable power, affordable devices, regulation and skills, and it does not replace roads, grids, clinics or schools.
  7. Three pathways to 2100 lead to very different worlds. If the Global South converges at 1% of the gap per year, its income reaches 35% of the high-income level by 2100, against 14% in a fragmented pathway. About 314 million children under five would die in 2025–2100 if convergence fails, against 181 million with accelerated convergence and 167 million when growth is paired with deliberate resilience-building. These are conditional illustrations, not forecasts.

Contents

  1. Executive SummaryVulnerability falls as economies catch up, but catching up has stalledp. 4
  2. 1Why Convergence Belongs in a Polycrisis Strategyp. 6
  3. 2What Global Economic Convergence Meansp. 8
  4. 3The Record: Divergence, Then a Short Catch-Upp. 11
  5. 4Convergence Across Eight Dimensionsp. 15
  6. 5Why Convergence Reduces Vulnerabilityp. 19
  7. 6Convergent Resilience Dividendsp. 23
  8. 7Bypass Pathways: Skipping Stagesp. 27
  9. 8What Can Stall Convergencep. 30
  10. 9Three Pathways to 2100p. 33
  11. 10Where Convergence Matters Most: Regionsp. 38
  12. 11A Convergence Strategy for Resiliencep. 40
  13. 12Conclusion: Convergence as Resilience Strategyp. 42
  14. Methods and Datap. 44
  15. Referencesp. 46

Section links open the PDF at the corresponding page in a new tab.

How to cite

Hughes, H. (2026). Global Economic Convergence as a Resilience Strategy: How narrowing the gaps between rich and poor economies can reduce vulnerability to the polycrisis, 2026–2100 (Polycrisis Resilience Series No. 11). H Heuristics. https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.34946971

BibTeX 
@techreport{hughes2026global,
  title = {Global Economic Convergence as a Resilience Strategy: How narrowing the gaps between rich and poor economies can reduce vulnerability to the polycrisis, 2026–2100},
  author = {Hughes, Hunter},
  institution = {H Heuristics},
  type = {Research Report},
  series = {H Heuristics Polycrisis Resilience Series},
  number = {11},
  year = {2026},
  month = nov,
  doi = {10.6084/m9.figshare.34946971},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.34946971},
  copyright = {CC BY-NC-ND 4.0},
  keywords = {global economic convergence, polycrisis resilience, Convergent Resilience Dividends, development economics, income gap, productivity, technological leapfrogging, bypass pathways, premature deindustrialisation, vulnerability reduction, scenarios to 2100, Global South, H Heuristics Polycrisis Resilience Framework}
}

Download citation: BibTeX (.bib) · RIS (.ris) · https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.34946971

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